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Abstract
A spoof attack, a subset of presentation attacks, is the use of an artificial replica
of a biometric in an attempt to circumvent a biometric sensor. Liveness de-
tection, or presentation attack detection, distinguishes between live and fake
biometric traits and is based on the principle that additional information can
be garnered above and beyond the data procured by a standard authentication
system to determine if a biometric measure is authentic.
The goals for the Liveness Detection (LivDet) competitions are to compare
software-based fingerprint liveness detection and artifact detection algorithms
(Part 1), as well as fingerprint systems which incorporate liveness detection or
artifact detection capabilities (Part 2), using a standardized testing protocol
and large quantities of spoof and live tests. The competitions are open to all
academic and industrial institutions which have a solution for either software-
based or system-based fingerprint liveness detection. The LivDet competitions
have been hosted in 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015 and have shown themselves to
provide a crucial look at the current state of the art in liveness detection schemes.
There has been a noticeable increase in the number of participants in LivDet
competitions as well as a noticeable decrease in error rates across competitions.
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Participants have grown from four to the most recent thirteen submissions for
Fingerprint Part 1. Fingerprints Part 2 has held steady at two submissions each
competition in 2011 and 2013 and only one for the 2015 edition. The continuous
increase of competitors demonstrates a growing interest in the topic.
Keywords: Fingerprint, Liveness Detection, Biometric
1. Introduction
Among biometrics, fingerprints are probably the best-known and widespread
because of the fingerprint properties: universality, durability and individuality.
Unfortunately it has been shown that fingerprint scanners are vulnerable to
presentation attacks1 with an artificial replica of a fingerprint. Therefore, it is5
important to develop countermeasures to those attacks.
Numerous methods have been proposed to solve the susceptibility of fin-
gerprint devices to attacks by spoof fingers. One primary countermeasure to
spoofing attacks is called “liveness detection” or presentation attack detection.
Liveness detection is based on the principle that additional information can be10
garnered above and beyond the data procured and/or processed by a standard
verification system, and this additional data can be used to verify if an image
is authentic. Liveness detection uses either a hardware-based or software-based
system coupled with the authentication program to provide additional security.
Hardware-based systems use additional sensors to gain measurements outside15
of the fingerprint image itself to detect liveness. Software-based systems use
image processing algorithms to gather information directly from the collected
fingerprint to detect liveness. These systems classify images as either live or
fake.
1Traditionally, a majority of papers refer to these types of attacks as “spoofing attacks” but
recently the term “presentation attacks” has become the standard [6]. Similarly, presentation
attack detection is the standard term for liveness detection. Presentation attack detection is
a more general term and can refer to multiple approaches for detecting a presentation attacks
beyond liveness detection.
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Since 2009, in order to assess the main achievements of the state of the art20
in fingerprint liveness detection, University of Cagliari and Clarkson University
organized the first Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition.
The First International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet)
2009 [1], provided an initial assessment of software systems based on the finger-
print image only. The second, third and fourth Liveness Detection Competitions25
(LivDet 2011 [2], 2013 [3] and 2015 [4]) were created in order to ascertain the
progressing state of the art in liveness detection, and also included integrated
system testing.
This paper reviews the previous LivDet competitions and how they have
evolved over the years. Section 2 of this paper describes the background of30
spoofing and liveness detection. Section 3 details the methods used in testing
for the LivDet competitions as well as descriptions of the datasets that have
generated from the competition so far. Section 4 discusses the trends across the
competitions reflecting advances in the state of the art. Section 5 concludes the
paper and discusses the future of the LivDet competitions.35
2. Background
The concept of spoofing has existed for some time now. Research into spoof-
ing can be seen beginning in 1998 from research conducted by D. Willis and M.
Lee where six different biometric fingerprint devices were tested against fake
fingers and it was found that four of the six were susceptible to spoofing attacks40
[8]. This research was approached again in 2000-2002 by multiple institutions
including; Putte and Kuening as well as Matsumoto et al. [9, 10]. Putte et al.
examined different types of scanning devices as well as different ways of coun-
terfeiting fingerprints [9]. The research presented by these researchers looked
at the vulnerability of spoofing. In 2001, Kallo (et al.) looked at a hardware45
solution to Liveness Detection; while in 2002, Schuckers delved into using soft-
ware approaches for Liveness Detection [11, 12]. Liveness detection, with either
hardware-based or software-based systems, is used to check if a presented fin-
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Figure 1: Negative impression of five fingers using consensual method.
gerprint originates from a live person or an artificial finger. Usually the result
of this analysis is a score used to classify images as either live or fake.50
Many solutions have been proposed to solve the vulnerability of spoofing
[13, 14]. Bozhao Tan et al. has proposed a solution based on ridge signal and
valley noise analysis [13]. This solution examines the perspiration patterns along
the ridge and the patterns of noise in the valleys of images [13]. It was proposed
that since live fingers sweat, but spoof fingers do not, the live fingerprint will55
look “patchy” compared to a spoof [13]. Also it was proposed that due to the
properties of a spoof material, spoof fingers will have granules in the valleys that
live fingers will not have [13]. Pietro Coli et al. examined static and dynamic
features of collected images on a large data set of images [14].
There are two general forms of creating artificial fingers, the cooperative60
method and non-cooperative method. In the cooperative method the subject
pushes their finger into a malleable material such as dental impression material,
plastic, or wax creating a negative impression of the fingerprint as a mold, see
Figure 1. The mold is then filled with a material, such as gelatin, PlayDoh or
silicone. This cast can be used to represent a finger from a live subject, see65
Figure 2.
The non-cooperative method involves enhancing a latent fingerprint left on
a surface, digitizing it through the use of a photograph, and finally printing the
negative image on a transparency sheet. This printed image can then be made
into a mold, for example, by etching the image onto a printed circuit board70
4
Figure 2: Latex spoof on finger.
(PCB) which can be used to create the spoof cast as seen on Figure 3.
Most competitions focus on matching, such as the Fingerprint Verification
Competition held in 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 [15] and the ICB Competition on
Iris Recognition (ICIR2013) [16]. However, these competitions did not consider
spoofing.75
The Liveness Detection Competition series was started in 2009 and created a
benchmark for measuring liveness detection algorithms, similar to matching per-
formance. At that time, there had been no other public competitions held that
has examined the concept of liveness detection as part of a biometric modality
in deterring spoof attacks. In order to understand the motivation of organizing80
such a competition, we observed that the first trials to face with this topic were
often carried out with home-made data sets that were not publicly available,
experimental protocols were not unique, and the same reported results were
obtained on very small data sets. We pointed out these issues in [7].
Therefore, the basic goal of LivDet has been since its birth to allow re-85
searchers testing their own algorithms and systems on publicly available data
sets, obtained and collected with the most updated techiques to replicate fin-
gerprints enabled by the experience of Clarkson and Cagliari laboratories, both
active on this problem since 2000 and 2003, respectively. At the same time,
using a “competition” instead of simply releasing data sets, could be assurance90
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Figure 3: Etched fingerprints on PCB.
of a free-of-charge, third-party testing using a sequestered test set. (Clarkson
and Cagliari has never took part in LivDet as competitors, due to conflict of
interest.)
LivDet 2009 provided results which demonstrated the state of the art at
that time [1] for fingerprint systems. LivDet continued in 2011, 2013 and 201595
[2, 3, 4] and contained two parts: evaluation of software-based systems in Part
1: Algorithms, and evaluation of integrated systems in Part 2: Systems. Fin-
gerprint will be the focus of this paper. However, LivDet 2013 also included a
Part 1: Algorithms for the Iris biometric [5] and is continuing in 2015.
Since 2009, evaluation of spoof detection for facial systems was performed in100
the Competition on Counter Measures to 2-D Facial Spoofing Attacks, first held
in 2011 and then held a second time in 2013. The purpose of this competition
is to address different methods of detection for 2-D facial spoofing [17]. The
competition dataset consisted of 400 video sequences, 200 of them real attempts
and 200 attack attempts [17]. A subset was released for training and then105
another subset of the dataset was used for testing purposes.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sum
LivDet 2009 4 6 9 2 23 21 65
LivDet 2011 3 7 21 10 41
LivDet 2013 16 10 26
Table 1: Number of LivDet citations on Google Scholar over the years.
During these years many works cited the publications related to the first
three LivDet competitions, 2009 [1], 2011 [2] and 2013 [3]. A quick Google
Scholar research produced 65 results for 2009, 41 for 2011 and 26 for 2013.
Their distribution is shown in more detail in Table 1, ordered by publication110
year2. In Tables 2, 3 and 4 a partial list of these publications is presented.
3. Methods and Datasets
The LivDet competitions feature two distinct parts; Part 1: Algorithms and
Part 2: Systems with protocols designed to eliminate variability that may be
present across different algorithms or systems. The protocols for each part will115
be described in further detail in this section with descriptions of each dataset
created through this competition.
3.1. Part 1: Algorithm Datasets
The datasets for Part 1: Algorithms changes with each competition. Each
competition consists of three to four datasets of live and spoof images from dif-120
ferent devices. Eighteen total datasets have been completed and made available
thus far in the past four competitions. Fifteen fingerprint liveness datasets and
three iris liveness datasets.
LivDet 2009 consisted of data from three optical sensors; Crossmatch, Iden-
tix, and Biometrika. The fingerprint images were collected using the consensual125
2Research was last updated on October 1, 2015
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Authors Algorithm Type Performance
(Average
Classification
Error)
J. Galbally, et al. [19] Quality Related Features. 6.6%
E. Marasco, and C. San-
sone [21]
Perspiration and Morphology-
based Static Features
12.5%
J. Galbally, et al. [22] Image Quality Assessment 8.2
E. Marasco, and C. San-
sone [23]
Multiple Textural Features 12.5%
L. Ghiani, et al. [24] Comparison of Algorithms N.A.
D. Gragnaniello, et al.
[25]
Wavelet-Markov Local 2.8%
R. Nogueira, et al. [27] Convolutional Networks 3.9%
Y. Jiang, and L. Xin
[28]
Co-occurrence Matrix 6.8%
Table 2: Publications that cite the LivDet 2009 paper.
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Authors Algorithm Type Performance
(Average
Classification
Error)
L. Ghiani, et al. [24] Comparison of Algorithms N.A.
X. Jia, et al. [29] Multi-Scale Local Binary Pat-
tern
7.5% and 8.9%
D. Gragnaniello, et al.
[30]
Local Contrast Phase Descrip-
tor
5.7%
N. Poh, et al. [31] Likelihood Ratio Computation N.A.
A. F. Sequeira, and J. S.
Cardoso [32]
Modeling the Live Samples Dis-
tribution
N.A.
L. Ghiani, et al. Binarized Statistical Image Fea-
tures.
7.2%
X. Jia, et al. [36] Multi-Scale Local Ternary Pat-
terns
9.8%
G.L. Marcialis, et al.
[36]
Comparison of Algorithms N.A.
R. Nogueira, et al. [27] Convolutional Networks 6.5%
Y. Zhang, et al. [38] Wavelet Analysis and Local Bi-
nary Pattern
12.5%
A. Rattani, et al. [39] Textural Algorithms N.A.
P. Johnson, and S.
Schuckers [40]
Pore Characteristics 12.0%
X. Jia, et al. [41] One-Class SVM N.A.
Y. Jiang, and L. Xin
[28]
Co-occurrence Matrix 11.0%
Table 3: Publications that cite the LivDet 2011 paper.
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Authors Algorithm Type Performance
(Average
Classification
Error)
C. Gottschlich, et al.
[42]
Histograms of Invariant Gradi-
ents.
6.7%
R. Nogueira, et al. [27] Convolutional Networks 3.6%
Y. Zhang, et al. [38] Wavelet Analysis and Local Bi-
nary Pattern
2.1%
P. Johnson, and S.
Schuckers [40]
Pore Characteristics N.A.%
Table 4: Publications that cite the LivDet 2013 paper.
approach from three different spoof material types; gelatin, silicone, and play-
doh. and numbers of images available can be found in [1]. Figure 4 shows
example images from the datasets.
The dataset for LivDet 2011 consisted of images from four different optical
devices, Biometrika, Digital Persona, ItalData and Sagem. The spoof materials130
were gelatin, latex, ecoflex, Play-doh, silicone and wood glue. More information
can be found in [2]. Figure 5 shows images used in the database.
The dataset for LivDet 2013 consisted of images from four different devices;
Biometrika, Crossmatch, ItalData and Swipe. Spoofs were made from gelatin,
body double, latex, play-doh, ecoflex, modasil, and wood glue. LivDet 2013135
featured the first use of the non-cooperative method for creating spoof images
and was used for Biometrika and ItalData. More information can be found in
[3]. Figure 6 gives example images from the databases.
The dataset for LivDet 2015 consists of images from four different optical
devices; Green Bit, Biometrika, Digital Persona and Crossmatch. The spoof140
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Figure 4: Examples of spoof images of the LivDet 2009 datasets. Crossmatch
(top): (a) Play-Doh, (b) gelatin, (c) silicone; Identix (middle): (d) Play-Doh,
(e) gelatin, (f) silicone; Biometrika (top): (g) Play-Doh, (h) gelatin, (i) silicone.
materials were Ecoflex, gelatin, latex, wood glue, a liquid Ecoflex and RTV (a
two-component silicone rubber) for the Green Bit, the Biometrika and the Dig-
ital Persona datasets, and Playdoh, Body Double, Ecoflex, OOMOO (a silicone
rubber) and a novel form of gelatin for Crossmatch dataset. More information
can be found in [4].145
3.2. Part 2: Systems Submissions
Public datasets were not released from systems collections, however data was
collected on the submitted systems. Unlike in Part 1: Algorithms where data
was pre-generated before the competition, Part 2: Systems data was collected
through systematic testing of submitted system. For LivDet 2011 this consisted150
of 500 live attempts from 50 people (totaling 5 images for each of the R1 and
R2 fingers) as well as 750 attempts with spoofs of five materials (play-doh,
gelatin, silicone, body double, and latex). For LivDet 2013, 1000 live attempts
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were conducted as well as 1000 spoof attempts from the materials; Play-Doh,
gelatin, Ecoflex, Modasil, and latex. In 2015 the system was tested using the155
three known spoof recipes. Two unknown spoof recipes were also tested to
examine the flexibility of the sensor toward novel spoof methods. The known
recipes were Playdoh, Body Double, and Ecoflex. The two unknown recipes used
were OOMOO (a silicone rubber) and a novel form of gelatin. 2011 attempts
were completed with 1010 live attempts from 51 subjects (2 images each of all160
10 fingers) and 1001 spoof attempts across the five different materials giving
approximately 200 images per spoof type. 500 spoofs were created from each of
5 fingers of 20 subjects for each of the five spoof materials. Two attempts were
performed with each spoof.
The submitted system needs to be able to output a file with the collected165
image as well as a liveness score on the range of 0 to 100 with 100 being the
maximum degree of liveness and 50 being the threshold value to determine if
an image is live or spoof. If the system is not able to process a live subject
it is counted as a failure to enroll and counted against the performance of the
system (as part of Ferrlive). However, if the system is unable to process a spoof170
finger it is considered as a fake non-response and counted as a positive in terms
of system effectiveness for spoof detection.
3.3. Image Quality
Fingerprint image quality has a powerful effect on the performance of a
matcher. Many commercial fingerprint systems contain algorithms to ensure175
that only higher quality images are accepted to the matcher. This rejects low
quality images where low quality images have been shown to degrade the per-
formance of a matcher [18]. The algorithms and systems submitted for this
competition did not use a quality check to determine what images would pro-
ceed to the liveness detection protocols. Through taking into account the quality180
of the images before applying liveness detection a more realistic level of error
can be shown.
Our methodology uses the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ) software
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to examine the quality of all fingerprints used for the competition and examine
the effects of removing lower quality fingerprint images on the liveness detection185
protocols submitted. NFIQ computes a feature vector from a quality image map
and minutiae quality statistics as an input to a multi-layer perceptron neural
network classifier [18]. The quality of the fingerprint is determined from the
neural network output. The quality for each image is assigned on a scale from
1 (highest quality) to 5 (lowest quality).190
3.4. Performance Evaluation
The parameters adopted for the performance evaluation are the following:
• Ferrlive: Rate of misclassified live fingerprints.
• Ferrfake: Rate of misclassified fake fingerprints.
• Average Classification Error (ACE): ACE = (Ferrlive+Ferrfake
2
)195
• Equal Error Rate (EER): Rate at which Ferrlive and Ferrfake are equal.
• Accuracy: Rate of correctly classified live and fake fingerprints at a 0.5
threshold.
3.5. Specific challenges
In the last two editions of the competition specific challenges were intro-200
duced. Two of the 2013 datasets, unlike all the other cases, contain spoofs that
were collected using latent fingerprints. The 2015 edition had two new com-
ponents: (1) the testing set included images from two kinds of spoof materials
which were not present in the training set in order to test the robustness of the
algorithms with regard to unknown attacks, and (2) one of the data sets was205
collected using a 1000 dpi sensor.
3.5.1. LivDet 2013 Consensual vs. Semi-Consensual
In the consensual method the subject pushed his finger into a malleable
material such as silicon gum creating a negative impression of the fingerprint
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as a mold. The mold was then filled with a material, such as Gelatin. The210
“semi-consensual method” consisted of enhancing a latent fingermark pressed
on a surface, and digitizing it through the use of a common scanner.3 Then,
through a binarization process and with an appropriate threshold choice, the
binarized image of the fingerprint was obtained. The thinning stage allowed the
line thickness to be reduced to one pixel obtaining the skeleton of the fingerprint215
negative. This image was printed on a transparency sheet, in order to have the
mold. A gelatin or silicone material was dripped over this image, and, after
solidification, separated and used as a fake fingerprint.
The consensual method leads to an almost perfect copy of a live finger, whose
mark on a surface is difficult to recognize as a fake unless through an expert220
dactiloscopist. On the other hand, the spoof created by semi- or unconsensual
method is much less similar. In a latent fingerprint, many details are lost and the
skeletonization process further deteriorates the spoof quality making it easier
to distinguish a live from a fake. However, while it could be hard to convince
someone to leave the cast of a finger, it’s potentially much easier to obtain one225
of his latent fingerprints. The spoof images in the Biometrika and Italdata 2013
datasets were created by printing the negative image on a transparency sheet.
As we will see in the next section, the error rates, as would be expected, are
lower than those of the other datasets.
3.5.2. LivDet 2015 Hidden Materials and 500 vs 1000 dpi230
As already stated, the testing sets of LivDet 2015 included spoof images of
never-seen-before materials. These materials were liquid Ecoflex and RTV for
Green Bit, Biometrika and Digital Persona datasets, and OOMOO and Gelatin
for Crossmatch dataset. Our aim was to assess the reliability of algorithms. As
a matter of fact, in a realistic scenario, the material used to attack a biometric235
system could be considered unknown as a liveness detector should be able to
3Obviously all subjects were fully aware of this process, and gave the full consent to replicate
their fingerprints from their latent marks.
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deal with any kind of spoof material.
Another peculiarity of the 2015 edition was the presence of the Biometrika
HiScan-PRO, a sensor with a resolution of 1000 dpi instead of ∼500 dpi reso-
lution for most of the datasets used so far in the competition. It is reasonable240
to hypothesize that doubling the image resolution, the feature extraction phase
should benefit as well as the final performance. The results that we will show
in the next section does not confirm this hypothesis.
4. Examination of Results
In this Section, we analyze the experimental results for the four LivDet edi-245
tions. Results show the growth and improvement across the four competitions.
4.1. Trends of Competitors and Results for Fingerprint Part 1: Algorithms
The number of competitors for Fingerprint Part 1: Algorithms have in-
creased during the last years. LivDet 2009 contained a total of 4 algorithm
submissions. LivDet 2011 saw a slight decrease in competitors with only 3 or-250
ganizations submitting algorithms, however LivDet 2013 and 2015 gave rise to
the largest of the competitions with 11 submitted algorithms, nine participants
in the former and ten in the latest. Submissions for each LivDet are detailed in
Table 5.
This increase of participants has shown the grown of interest in the topic,255
which has been coupled with the general decrease of the error rates.
First of all, the two best algorithms for each competition, in terms of per-
formance, are detailed in Table 6 based on the average error rate across the
datasets where “Minimum Average” error rates are the best results and “Sec-
ond Average” are the second best results.260
There is a stark difference between the results seen from LivDet 2009 to
LivDet 2015. LivDet 2009 to LivDet 2011 did not see much decrease in error,
where LivDet 2013 and LivDet 2015 each decreased in error from the previous
compeition.
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Participants LivDet 2009 Algorithm Name
Dermalog Identification Systems GmbH Dermalog
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid ATVS
Anonymous Anonymous
Anonymous2 Anonymous2
Participants LivDet 2011 Algorithm Name
Dermalog Identification Systems GmbH Dermalog
University of Naples Federico II Federico
Chinese Academy of Sciences CASIA
Participants LivDet 2013 Algorithm Name
Dermalog Identification Systems GmbH Dermalog
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid ATVS
HangZhou JLW Technology Co Ltd HZ-JLW
Federal University of Pernambuco Itautec
Chinese Academy of Sciences CAoS
University of Naples Federico II (algorithm 1) UniNap1
University of Naples Federico II (algorithm 2) UniNap2
University of Naples Federico II (algorithm 3) UniNap3
First Anonymous participant Anonym1
Second Anonymous participant Anonym2
Third Anonymous participant Anonym3
Participants LivDet 2015 Algorithm Name
Instituto de Biociencias, Letras e Ciencias Exatas COPILHA
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R) CSI
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R) CSI MM
Dermalog hbirkholz
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco hectorn
Anonymous participant anonym
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co., Ltd jinglian
Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco UFPE I
Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco UFPE II
University of Naples Federico II unina
New York University nogueira
Zhejiang University of Technology titanz
Table 5: Participants for Part 1: Algorithms.
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2009
Minimum
Avg Ferrlive
Minimum
Avg Ferrfake
Second Avg
Ferrlive
Second Avg
Ferrfake
13.2% 5.4% 20.1% 9.0%
2011
Minimum
Avg Ferrlive
Minimum
Avg Ferrfake
Second Avg
Ferrlive
Second Avg
Ferrfake
11.8% 24.8% 24.5% 24.8%
2013
Minimum
Avg Ferrlive
Minimum
Avg Ferrfake
Second Avg
Ferrlive
Second Avg
Ferrfake
11.96% 1.07% 17.64% 1.10%
2015
Minimum
Avg Ferrlive
Minimum
Avg Ferrfake
Second Avg
Ferrlive
Second Avg
Ferrfake
5.13% 2.79% 6.45% 4.26%
Table 6: Two best error rates for each competition. It can be noticed a
positive trend in terms of both Ferrlive and Ferrfake parameters. In particular
2011 and 2015 exhibited very difficult tasks due to the high quality of
fingerprint images thus they should be taken into account as a reference of
current liveness detector performance against the “worst scenario”, that is, the
high quality reproduction of a subject’s fingerprint.
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The mean values of the ACE (Average Classification Error) over all the265
participants calculated for each dataset confirm this trend. Mean and standard
deviation are shown in Table 7.
The standard deviation values ranges between 5 and 18% depending on the
dataset and competition editions. Mean ACE values confirm the error increase
in 2011 due to the high quality of cast and fake materials. The low values in270
2013 for the Biometrika and Italdata are due, as stated before, to the use of
latent fingerprints in the spoof creation process, creating lower quality spoofs
that are easier to detect. In order to confirm that, we compared these values
with those obtained for the same sensors in 2011 (see Table 8). Last two rows of
Table 8 report average classification error and related standard deviation over275
above sets. Obviously, further and independent experiments are needed because
participants of 2011 and 2013 were different so that different algorithms are
likely also. However, results highlight the performance virtually achievable over
two scenarios: a sort of “worst case”, namely, the one represented by LivDet
2011, where quality of spoofs is very high, and a sort of “realistic case” (LivDet280
2013), where spoofs are created from latent marks as one may expect. The fact
that even in this case the average error is 10%, whilst the standard deviation
does not differ with regard to LivDet 2011, should not be underestimated. The
improvement could be likely due to the different ways of creating the fakes.
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2009
Mean Std. Dev.
Identix 8.27 4.65
Crossmaatch 15.59 5.60
Biometrika 32.59 9.64
2011
Mean Std. Dev.
Biometrika 31.30 10.25
ItalData 29.50 9.42
Sagem 16.70 5.33
Digital Persona 23.47 13.70
2013
Mean Std. Dev.
Biometrika 7.32 8.80
Italdata 12.25 18.08
Swipe 16.67 15.30
2015
Mean Std. Dev.
GreenBit 11.47 7.10
Biometrika 15.81 7.12
DigitalPersona 14.89 13.72
Crossmatch 14.65 10.28
Table 7: Mean and standard deviation ACE values for each dataset of the
competition.
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Figure 5: Examples of fake fingerprint images of the LivDet 2011 datasets,
from Biometrika (a) latex, (b) gelatin, (c) silicone; from Digital Persona: (d)
latex, (e) gelatin, (f) silicone; from Italdata: (g) latex (h) gelatin (i) silicone;
from Sagem: (j) latex (k) gelatin (l) silicone.
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Figure 6: Examples of fake fingerprint images of the LivDet 2013. From
Crossmatch (a) body double, (b) latex, (c) wood glue, from Biometrika (d)
gelatine, (e) latex, (f) wood glue, from Italdata (g) gelatine, (h) latex, (i) wood
glue, from Swipe (j) body double, (k) latex, (l) wood glue.
Consensual Semi-consensual
(LivDet 2011) (LivDet 2013)
Biometrika 31.30 7.32
ItalData 29.50 12.25
Mean 30.40 9.78
Standard Deviation 1.27 3.49
Table 8: Comparison between mean ACE values for Biometrika and Italdata
datasets from LivDet 2011 and 2013.
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The abnormally high values for the LivDet 2013 Crossmatch dataset oc-285
curred due to an occurrence in the Live data. The Live images were difficult
for the algorithms to recognize. All data was collected in the same time frame
and data in training and testing sets were determined randomly among the data
collected. A follow-up test was conducted using benchmark algorithms at Uni-
versity of Cagliari and Clarkson University which revealed similar scores on the290
benchmark algorithms as the submitted algorithms with initial results had an
EER of 41.28%. The data was further tested with 1000 iterations of train/test
dataset generation using a random selection of images for the live training and
test sets (with no common subjects between the sets which is a requirement for
all LivDet competitions). This provided new error rates shown (see Table 9 and295
Figures 7 and 8)
Average Error Rate Standard Deviation
FerrLive 7.57% 2.21%
FerrFake 13.41% 1.95%
Equal Error Rate 9.92% 1.42%
Table 9: Crossmatch 2013 Error Rates across 1000 Tests
Examining these results allows us to draw the conclusion that the original
selection of subjects was an anomaly that caused improper error rates because
each other iteration, even only changing a single subject, dropped FerrLive error
rates to 15% and below. Data is being more closely examined in future LivDet300
competitions in order to counteract this problem with data being processed on
a benchmark algorithm before being given to participants. The solution to this
for the LivDet 2013 data going forward is to rearrange the training and test sets
for future studies using this data. Researchers will need to be clear which split
of training/test they used in their study. For this reason we removed from the305
experimental results of those obtained with the Crossmatch 2013 dataset.
LivDet 2015 error rates confirm a decreasing trend with respect to attacks
22
Figure 7: FerrLive Rates across 1000 tests for Crossmatch 2013.
made up of high quality spoofs, with all the mean values between 11% and 16%.
These results are summarized in Figure 9.
Reported error rates suggest a slow, but steady advancement in the art of310
liveness and artifact detection. This gives supporting evidence that the technol-
ogy is evolving and learning to adapt and overcome the presented challenges.
Comparing the performance of the LivDet 2015 datasets (as shown in Table
7 and in more details in [4]) two other important remarks can be made: the
higher resolution for Biometrika sensor did not necessarily achieve the best315
classification performance, while the small size of the images for the Digital
Persona device generally degrades the accuracy of all algorithms.
The DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) curves in Figures 10 (a), 11 (a), 12 (a),
13 (a), show the performance of three of the four best algorithms for LivDet
2015 sorted by ACE (nogueira, unina and anonym). Unfortunately, we could not320
plot the jinglian’s algorithm performance because it output only two possible
values, namely 0 or 100. There being no intermediate values it was impossible
to obtain different Ferrlive and Ferrfake values varying the threshold value and
produce the DET curve. More discussion on fusion results for Figures 10 (b),
11 (b), 12 (b), 13 (b) will be provided in further below.325
Another important indicator of an algorithm validity is the Ferrfake value
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Figure 8: FerrFake Rates across 1000 tests for Crossmatch 2013.
calculated when Ferrlive = 1%. This value represent the percentage of spoofs
able to hack into the system when the rate of legitimate users that are rejected
is no more than 1%. As a matter of fact, by varying the threshold value,
different Ferrfake and Ferrlive values are obtained and, as the threshold grows330
from 0 to 100, Ferrfake decrease and Ferrlive increase. Obviously ferrlive value
must be kept low to minimize the inconvenience to authorized users but, just as
important, the low ferrfake value limits the number of unauthorized users able
to enter into the system.
Results in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13 show that even the best performing335
algorithm (nogueira) is not yet good enough since when Ferrlive = 1%, the
ferrfake values (testing on all materials) ranges from 2.66% to 19.10%. These
are the percentage of unauthorized users that the system is unable to correctly
classify. If we consider only the unknown materials, the results are even worse,
ranging from 3.69% to 25.30%.340
On the basis of such results, we can say that there is no specific algorithm,
among the analyzed ones, able to generalize against never-seen-before spoofing
attacks. We observed a performance drop and also found that the amount of
the drop is unpredictable as it depends on the material. This should be matter
of future discussions.345
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all materials known materials unknown materials
unina 7.42 2.47 14.49
nogueira 2.66 1.94 3.69
anonym 18.61 10.75 29.82
average 9.56 5.05 16.00
std. dev. 8.19 4.94 13.13
Table 10: Ferrfake values of the best algorithms calculated when
Ferrlive = 1% for the Crossmatch dataset.
all materials known materials unknown materials
unina 51.30 50.85 52.20
nogueira 19.10 16.00 25.30
anonym 80.83 79.25 84.00
average 50.41 48.70 53.83
std. dev. 30.87 31.68 29.38
Table 11: Ferrfake values of the best algorithms calculated when
Ferrlive = 1% for the Digital Persona dataset.
all materials known materials unknown materials
unina 41.80 36.10 53.20
nogueira 17.90 15.15 23.40
anonym 75.47 75.25 75.90
average 45.06 42.17 50.83
std. dev. 28.92 30.51 26.33
Table 12: Ferrfake values of the best algorithms calculated when
Ferrlive = 1% for the Green Bit dataset.
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Figure 9: LivDet results over the years: near red colors for 2009, near green
for 2011, near magenta for 2013 and near blue for 2015.
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Figure 10: LivDet 2015 Greenbit dataset: DET curves of the nogueira, unina
and anonym algorithms (a), DET curves of the fusion of the three classifiers
(b).
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Figure 11: LivDet 2015 Biometrika dataset: DET curves of the nogueira,
unina and anonym algorithms (a), DET curves of the fusion of the three
classifiers (b).
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Figure 12: LivDet 2015 Digital Persona dataset: DET curves of the nogueira,
unina and anonym algorithms (a), DET curves of the fusion of the three
classifiers (b).
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Figure 13: LivDet 2015 Crossmatch dataset: DET curves of the nogueira,
unina and anonym algorithms (a), DET curves of the fusion of the three
classifiers (b).
all materials known materials unknown materials
unina 11.60 7.50 19.80
nogueira 15.20 12.60 20.40
anonym 48.40 44.05 57.10
average 25.07 21.38 32.43
std. dev. 20.29 19.79 21.36
Table 13: Ferrfake values of the best algorithms calculated when
Ferrlive = 1% for the Biometrika dataset.
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On the other hand, the performance difference among algorithms may be
complementary, that is, one algorithm may be able to detect spoofs that another
one does not. Accordingly, Figures 14, 15, 16 and 17 show, for each dataset,
the 2D and 3D spread plots generated using again three out of the four better
algorithms. In the 3D plots each point coordinate corresponds to the three350
match scores obtained by the three algorithms for each image. In the 2D plots
the same results are presented using two algorithms at a time for a total of three
2D plots for each 3D plot. These plots give an idea of the correlation level of
the spoof detection ability of the selected algorithms. As a matter of fact, it
appears that in many doubtful cases, the uncertainty of a classifier does not355
correspond to that of the others. For cases which have a high correlation, the
points in the graph would be more or less along a diagonal line. However on
this plot, the values are well distributed and this indicate a lower correlation
between the algorithms and thus may be complementary.
Since there is evidence that the submitted algorithms may be complemen-360
tary, we performed three fusion techniques at the score level using again three
out of the four better algorithms. We used the sum of the a posteriori proba-
bilities generated by the three algorithms, the product of the same a posteriori
probabilities and the majority vote (each fingerprint image is classified as live
or fake if the majority of individual algorithms rank it as live or fake). These365
three fusion techniques have very different characteristics from each other: the
product tends to crush on a negative classification (i.e. the pattern rejection)
rather than positive (for the zero-product property); the sum instead has an
opposite characteristic namely it smooths the differences (such as a low-pass
filter); finally, the majority emphasize where classifiers agree. In order to show370
the pros and cons of these classifiers fusion we also plot the curve of the so called
“Oracle response”. The Oracle is an ideal fusion technique that correctly clas-
sifies a pattern if that pattern is correctly classified by at least one of the single
classifiers. It indicates the maximum accuracy that can be potentially achieved.
Obviously, the more the results of the various classifiers are complementary the375
better are the results of the oracle.
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Figure 14: 2D and 3D spread plots for the Greenbit dataset: (a) unina -
nogueira, (b) nogueira - anonym, (c) unina - anonym, (d) nogueira - unina -
anonym.
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Figure 15: 2D and 3D spread plots for the Biometrika dataset: (a) unina -
nogueira, (b) nogueira - anonym, (c) unina - anonym, (d) nogueira - unina -
anonym.
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Figure 16: 2D and 3D spread plots for the Digital Persona dataset: (a) unina -
nogueira, (b) nogueira - anonym, (c) unina - anonym, (d) nogueira - unina -
anonym.
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Figure 17: 2D and 3D spread plots for the Crossmatch dataset: (a) unina -
nogueira, (b) nogueira - anonym, (c) unina - anonym, (d) nogueira - unina -
anonym.
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The DET curves in Figures 10 (b), 11 (b), 12 (b), 13 (b), compared with that
of the single classifiers, clearly show a result improvement especially when using
the sum rule. As a matter of fact, as stated before, sum smooths the differences.
If score values are balanced (that is x for accept and 1-x for reject) the sum rule380
emphasizes where classifiers agree as for the majority vote. Moreover, since it
averages the results, little doubts of two (wrong) classifiers may be counterbal-
anced by a strong performance in the (correct) third, leading to better results.
The only case in which the performance declines is that of the Digital Persona
dataset. Although the fusion at score-level appear a good solution to improve385
the performance, current results suggest that individual algorithms must be
carefully selected and also appropriate combination methodologies should be
studied as well.
4.2. Trends of Competitors and Results for Fingerprint Part 2: Systems
Fingerprint Part 2: Systems has not yet shown growth in the number of390
competitors, but it has only existed for 3 competitions thus far. There are more
limitations to the systems testing portion. It is not surprising that there are
not great numbers of entrants given the need for a full fingerprint recognition
device to be built with an integrated liveness detection module. There has also
been a general lack of interest in companies shipping full systems for testing395
and it appears that there is more comfort in submitting an algorithm. Both
Livdet 2011 and LivDet 2013 had 2 submissions whilst LivDet 2015 had only
one. Information about competitors is shown in Table 14.
This portion of the LivDet competitions has distinct recognition for the rapid
decrease in error rates. In the span of 2 years, the best results from LivDet 2011400
were worse than the worst results of LivDet 2013. Thus, systems tests showed
a quicker decrease in error rates as well as the one systems submission in 2013
had lower error rates than any submitted algorithms in LivDet.
In 2011, Dermalog performed at a FerrLive of 42.5% and a FerrFake of
0.8%. GreenBit performed at a FerrLive of 38.8% and a FerrFake of 39.47%.405
Both systems had high FerrLive scores.
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Participants LivDet 2011 Algorithm Name
Dermalog Identification Systems GmbH Dermalog
GreenBit GreenBit
Participants LivDet 2013 Algorithm Name
Dermalog Identification Systems GmbH Dermalog
Anonymous Anonymous1
Participants LivDet 2015 Algorithm Name
Anonymous Anonymous2
Table 14: Participants for Part 2: Systems.
The 2013 edition produced much better results since Dermalog performed
at a FerrLive of 11.8% and a FerrFake of 0.6%. Anonymous1 performed at a
FerrLive of 1.4% and a FerrFake of 0.0%. Both systems had low FerrFake rates.
Anonymous1 received a perfect score of 0.0% error, successfully determining410
every spoof finger presented as a spoof.
Anonymous2, in 2015, scored a FerrLive of 14.95% and a FerrFake of 6.29%
at the (given) threshold of 50 15 showing an improvement over the general
results seen in LivDet 2011, however the anonymous system did not perform as
well as what was seen in LivDet 2013. There is an 11.09% FerrFake for known415
recipes and 1% for unknown recipes (15). This result is opposite what has
been seen in previous LivDet competitions where known spoof types typically
have a better performance than unknown spoof types. The error rate for spoof
materials was primarily due to impact on color differences error for the playdoh.
Testing across 6 different colors of playdoh found that certain colors behaved420
in different ways. For yellow and white playdoh, the system detected spoofs as
fake with high accuracy. For brown and black playdoh, the system would not
collect an image. Therefore, it was recorded as a fake non-response and not
an error in detection of spoofs. For pink and lime green playdoh, the system
incorrectly accepted spoofs as live for almost 100% of images collected. The425
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fact that almost all pink and lime green playdoh images were accepted as live
images resulted in a 28% total error rate for playdoh. The system had a 6.9%
Fake Non-Response Rate primarily due to brown and black playdoh. This is the
first LivDet competition where color of playdoh has been examined in terms of
error rates.430
Examining the trends of results over the three competitions has shown that
since 2011 there has been a downward trend in error rates for the systems.
Ferrlive in 2015 while higher than 2013, is drastically lower than 2011. FerrFake
has had similar error rates over the years. While the 2015 competition showed
a 6.29% Ferrfake, the majority of that error stems from playdoh materials,435
particularly pink and lime colors. If you discount the errors seen in playdoh,
the FerrFake is below 2% for the 2015 system. The error rates for winning
systems over the years is shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19
5. Quality analysis: A Lesson Learned from the LivDet Experience
This section explores the impact of spoof quality on algorithm performance.440
Over a time span of ten years, the researchers in the respective groups have
searched for materials suitable for creating fingerprint spoofs by experimenting
with a very large number of materials and related variants. This process is per-
formed independent of the feature extraction algorithms and the classification
methods adopted. In general, it is difficult to create a spoof fingerprint that445
gives good quality fingerprint images on a consistent basis. The quality analysis
here reflects this experience.
With regard to the observation above, Tables 16, 17 report a summary of
our research. They include a certain number of materials used as cast and/or
mold. Table 16 summarizes the subjective evaluation made by our stuff over ten450
years experience, and more than 50000 spoofs realized, of the visual quality of
the obtained fake fingerprints when combining the mold material (columns) and
the cast material (rows). The visual quality assessment has been made up on
the basis of the analysis at the microscope of the spoofs and also the quality of
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Figure 18: FerrFake for winning systems by year .
images acquired by the capture devices. We experienced that certain materials455
are less suitable than others. Several of them are not able to replicate the ridges
and valleys flow without adding evident artifacts as bubbles and altering the
ridges edges.
Table 17 shows the subjective evaluation on the easiness of obtaining a good
spoof from the combination of the same materials of Table 16. This evaluation460
depends on the solidification time of the adopted material, the level of difficulty
in separating mold and cast without destroying one of them or both, the natural
dryness or wetness level of the related spoof.
Tables 16, 17 show that, from a practical viewpoint, many materials are
difficult to manage when fabricating a fake finger. In many cases, the materials465
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Submitted System FerrLive FerrFake
Anonymous 14.95% 6.29%
Submitted System FerrFake FerrFake
Known Unknown
Anonymous 11.09% 1.00%
Table 15: FerrLive and FerrFake for submitted system in LivDet 2015.
Mold/Material Foil RTV Modasil Plasticine
Alginat 5 5
RTV 2 2 4
Ecoflex 4 1 3
Gelatine 2 1 3
Latex 2 1 3
Modasil 2 2 4
Transparent 3 5
Silicone
White 2
Silicone
Wood glue 2 1 3
SILIGUM 2 5
Table 16: Quality degree in the spoof fabrication process: 1-Very high, 2-High,
3-Medium, 4-Low, 5-Very Low.
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Mold/Material Foil RTV Modasil Plasticine
Alginat 5 5
RTV 1 4 3
Ecoflex 1 4 4
Gelatine 1 4 3
Latex 1 4 3
Modasil 1 4 3
Transparent 1 3
Silicone
White 1
Silicone
Wood glue 1 4 4
SILIGUM 1 3
Table 17: Easiness degree in the fake fabrication process: 1-Very High, 2-High,
3-Medium, 4-Low, 5-Very Low.
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Figure 19: FerrLive for winning systems by year .
with this property also exhibit a low subjective quality level.
Therefore, thanks to this lesson, the LivDet competition challenge partic-
ipants with images coming from the spoofs obtained with the best and most
“potentially dangerous” materials. The materials choice is made on the basis
of the best trade off between the criteria pointed out in Tables 16, 17 and the470
objective quality values output by quality assessment algorithms such as NFIQ.
What reported has been confirmed along the four LivDet editions. In par-
ticular the FerrFake and FerrLive rates for each differing quality levels support
the idea that the images quality level is correlated with the error rate decrease.
The error rates for each range of quality levels for Dermalog in LivDet 2011 Fin-475
gerprint Part 1: Algorithms is shown in figure 20, as an example. The graphs
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Figure 20: Error rates by quality level.
showcase from images of only quality level 1 up to all quality levels being shown.
As lower quality spoof images were added, ferrfake generally decreased. For all
images which included the worst quality images, the error rates were less con-
sistent likely due to the variability in low quality spoofs.480
The percentage of images at each quality level for two representative datasets
for LivDet 2011, 2013, and 2015, respectively, are given in Figures 21, 22, and
23. The Crossmatch dataset had high percentages of the data being in the top
two quality levels in both LivDet 2011 and 2013. The swipe dataset had many
images that were read as being of lower quality which could be seen in the data485
itself because of the difficulty in collecting spoof data on the swipe device.
6. Conclusions
Since its first edition in 2009, the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competi-
tion was aimed to allow research centres and companies a fair and independent
assessment of their anti-spoofing algorithms and systems.490
We have seen over time an increasing interest for this event, and the general
recognition for the enormous amount of data made publicly available. The num-
ber of citations that LivDet competitions have collected is one of the tangible
signs of such interest (about 100 citations according to Google Scholar) and fur-
ther demonstrates the benefits that the scientific community has received from495
LivDet events.
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The competition results show that liveness detection algorithms and systems
strongly improved their performance: from about 70% classification accuracy
achieved in LivDet 2011, to 90% classification accuracy in LivDet 2015. This
result, obtained under very difficult conditions like the ones of the consensual500
methodology of fingerprints replication, is comparable with that obtained in
LivDet 2013 (first two data sets), where the algorithms performance was tested
under the easier task of fingerprints replication from latent marks. Moreover,
the two challenges characterizing the last edition, namely, the presence of 1000
dpi capture device and the evaluation against “unknown” spoofing materials,505
further contributed to show the great improvement that researchers achieved on
these issues: submitted algorithms performed very well on both 500 and 1000
dpi capture devices, and some of them also exhibited a good robustness degree
against never-seen-before attacks. Results reported on fusion also shows that
the liveness detection could further benefit from the combination of multiple510
features and approaches. A specific section on algorithms and systems fusion
might be explicitly added to a future LivDet edition.
There is a dark side of the Moon, of course. It is evident that, despite
the remarkable results reported in this paper, there is a clear need of further
improvements. Current performance for most submissions are not yet good515
enough for embedding a liveness detection algorithm into fingerprint verification
system where the error rate is still too high for many real applications. In
the authors’ opinion, discovering and explaining benefits and limitations of the
currently used features is still an issue whose solution should be encouraged,
because only the full understanding of the physical process which leads to the520
finger’s replica and what features extraction process exactly does will shed light
on the characteristics most useful for classification. We are aware that this is
a challenging task, and many years could pass before seeing concrete results.
However, we believe this could be the next challenge for a future edition of
LivDet, the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition.525
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